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U.S. WAR POWERS AND THE POTENTIAL
BENEFITS OF COMPARATIVISM
CURTIS A. BRADLEY
There is no issue of foreign relations law more important than the allocation of
authority over the use of military force. This issue is especially important for the United
States given the frequency with which it is involved in military activities abroad. Yet there
is significant uncertainty and debate in the United States over this issue—in particular, over
whether and to what extent military actions must be authorized by Congress. Because U.S.
courts in the modern era have generally declined to review the legality of military actions,
disputes over this issue have had to be resolved, as a practical matter, through the political
process. For those who believe that it is important to have legislative involvement in
decisions to use force, the political process has not proven to be satisfactory: presidents
have often used military force without obtaining congressional approval, and Congress
generally has done little to resist such presidential unilateralism.
The United States is not the only country to struggle with regulating the domestic
authority to use military force. This issue of foreign relations law is common to
constitutional democracies, and nations vary substantially in how they have addressed the
issue. Comparative study of such approaches should be of inherent interest to scholars and
students, including those trying to better understand the U.S. approach. Whether and to
what extent such study should also inform the interpretation or revision of U.S. law presents
a more complicated set of questions that are affected in part by one’s legal methodology and
how the comparative materials are being invoked.
This Chapter begins by describing the exercise of war powers authority in the United
States, both before and after World War II, as well as some of the limitations on
congressional and judicial checks on presidential uses of military force. It then considers the
potential value of studying the war powers law and practice of other countries, as well as
some of the reasons to be cautious about relying on such comparative materials.
Constitutional Text and Pre-World War II History
The law governing the distribution of war authority in the United States is
complicated and, in many respects, uncertain. The U.S. Constitution assigns a variety of
war-related powers to Congress, including the powers to appropriate and spend money, raise
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and support the military, and declare war.1 It also makes the President the Commander in
Chief of the armed forces.2 Although Congress’s authority to issue declarations of war
might suggest that its approval is needed before the United States enters into a war, there is
some question about this, given that undeclared wars were common at the time the
Constitution was adopted and are now the norm. Indeed, the United States has been
involved in hundreds of military conflicts in its history but has declared war in only five of
them, and the last time the United States declared war was during World War II. Even if
Congress has the sole power to declare war for the United States, the text of the Constitution
does not clearly say that Congress has the sole power to authorize uses of military force
when war is not declared.3 Moreover, it may be that not all uses of force even qualify as acts
of war.
Most scholars studying the issue have nevertheless concluded that the Constitution,
as originally understood, requires the President to obtain congressional authorization before
using military force against another state, except when acting in self-defense. This view
appears to have been the understanding of early presidents. For example, the first U.S.
president, George Washington, expressed the view that “[t]he Constitution vests the power
of declaring war in Congress; therefore no offensive expedition of importance can be
undertaken until they have deliberated on the subject, and authorized such a measure.”4 The
President, under this view, could use force against another state only in defense.
Despite this early understanding, there were uncertainties in the nineteenth century
about when congressional authorization was required. These uncertainties included: What
constitutes self-defense, as opposed to offensive action? Does self-defense include, for
example, the protection of Americans (and perhaps also their property) abroad? Does it
include counter-attacks or reprisals, or just repelling attacks? To what extent must Congress
authorize military action against non-state actors, such as pirates or unrecognized
government entities? More generally, are there instances in which the use of force does not
amount to “war,” and, if so, must Congress authorize those lower-level uses of force?
Against a backdrop of such uncertainties, there were a number of instances during
the nineteenth century in which the United States used military force without congressional
authorization—for example, to protect Americans and their trade activities abroad. Most of
these military actions were small in scale and did not involve protracted engagements. On
occasion, they triggered domestic controversy. For example, in the mid-nineteenth century
there was debate in Congress over whether the military had exceeded its constitutional
authority in bombarding Greytown, Nicaragua in retaliation for damage to American
property and an injury to a U.S. official. In justifying the military’s action, President Pierce
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likened Greytown to “a piratical resort of outlaws or a camp of savages” rather than to a
nation and argued that the U.S. action was consistent with international practice.5 A court
later upheld the constitutionality of the bombardment, reasoning that the core “object and
duty” of governments is to protect their citizens “whether abroad or at home” and that the
President is the appropriate actor within the United States to whom “citizens abroad must
look for protection of person and of property.”6
The understanding of war powers described above, even with its many uncertainties,
came under further strain during the early twentieth century. In 1900, President McKinley
sent over 5,000 U.S. troops to China during the Boxer Rebellion, as part of a multinational
coalition, without congressional authorization. In doing so, he emphasized that the U.S.
action “involved no war against the Chinese nation” and was justified in part by the need to
“secur[e] wherever possible the safety of American life and property in China.”7 In
addition, on numerous occasions during the early twentieth century presidents used military
force to intervene in Latin American countries, without congressional authorization,
ostensibly to restore order and protect American citizens and their property.8 These
interventions were justified as “police actions,” on the theory that the countries involved
were not capable of maintaining law and order on their own. As President William Howard
Taft explained after he left the presidency, while using force to protect American citizens
abroad was potentially an “act of war [as a matter of constitutional law] if committed in a
country like England or Germany or France,” this was not the case in countries where “law
and order are not maintained, as in some Central and South American countries.”9
Despite this practice, Congress expressly declared war for the two most significant
conflicts that the United States was involved in during the first half of the twentieth
century—World War I and World War II. But World War II was the last time that Congress
formally declared war.
Post-World World War II History
The establishment of the United Nations in 1945 added another complication to the
legal analysis concerning U.S. war powers. Article 42 of the United Nations Charter gives
the Security Council the power to authorize nations to use military force to address threats to
the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. This delegation of authority to the
Council presents questions for the U.S. domestic law of war powers: In particular, given
5
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that the Senate approved the Charter, including its delegation of authority to the Council,
does a Council authorization of force remove the need for congressional authorization of
such force?10 Additional questions are implicated by Article 43 of the Charter, which
envisions that nations will enter into agreements to make military forces available for use by
the Council. Neither the United States nor any other country has entered into an Article 43
agreement, but Congress did contemplate that such an agreement might be made when it
enacted the UN Participation Act in 1945, which specifically authorized the President to
negotiate an Article 43 agreement. Although the Act specified that any such agreement
would have to be approved by Congress, it also made clear that once this happened the
forces could be used without further congressional approval.11
This new legal landscape would quickly be tested in 1950 when President Truman
sent forces to defend South Korea in the Korean War. Although this was a substantial
military campaign that lasted several years and involved tens of thousands of U.S.
casualties, Truman never sought or obtained formal congressional authorization, let alone a
declaration of war. In defending the President’s actions, the State Department emphasized
that the Security Council had authorized the use of force, and it argued that the “continued
existence of the United Nations as an effective international organization is a paramount
United States interest.”12 The Department also cited to past presidential uses of force that
did not have express congressional authorization, such as in the Boxer Rebellion.
Although the Korean War is potentially an important precedent in favor of
presidential unilateralism in using military force, its precedential weight has generally been
thought to be limited, for several reasons: There has long been debate about whether
Truman’s action was constitutional; it occurred at a time when there was significant
uncertainty about how the UN Charter framework interacted with the U.S. law of war
powers; and most subsequent military actions that have involved a substantial use of ground
troops have been authorized by Congress (namely, the Vietnam War, both Iraq wars, and the
war in Afghanistan). Historical practice such as this is viewed by many as a significant
consideration in ascertaining the distribution of war powers authority in the United States,
given the absence of clear constitutional text or judicial precedent.13
10

For debate over this issue, compare Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of
War: “The Old Order Changeth,” 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 63, 72 (1991) (“When the President commits U.S. forces
to a UN police action in accordance with Article 42 of the Charter, it is because the U.S. Government is
obliged by international law to comply. Such compliance by the President with international law is not
prohibited—indeed, it is required—by the Constitution.”), with Michael J. Glennon, The Constitution and
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 74, 88 (1991) (“What the President
constitutionally needs from the United States Congress, he cannot get from the United Nations Security
Council.”). Somewhat similar issues are raised by the self-defense treaties such as the North Atlantic Treaty,
in which the Senate has consented to commitments whereby the United States has promised to use force to
defend allies if they are attacked.
11

See 22 U.S.C. § 287d.

12

Authority of the President to Repel the Attack in Korea, DEP’T ST. BULL. (U.S. Dep’t of State,
Washington, D.C.), July 31, 1950, at 177.
13

See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126
HARV. L. REV. 411, 461-68 (2012).

5

The War Powers Resolution
The Vietnam War of the 1960s and 1970s, which was authorized at least to some
extent by Congress, became highly controversial and led to Congress’s most vigorous effort
to regulate presidential war-making. In 1973, Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution
over President Nixon’s veto, and the Resolution (which, despite its title, is a binding statute,
to the extent it is constitutional) continues in force today. The Resolution states that its
purpose is to “insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will
apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to
the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.”14
In addition to provisions requiring that the president consult with and report to
Congress about the introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities, the Resolution provides that if
a President has introduced U.S. forces into hostilities, the President must terminate the use
of these forces within 60 days unless Congress authorizes the operation.15 Such
authorization, the Resolution further states, is not to be inferred from any treaty unless
Congress has implemented the treaty with legislation that specifically authorizes the use of
U.S. armed forces.16 Finally, the Resolution more generally expresses the view (in a
provision that the executive branch contends is not legally binding) that:
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to
introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,
are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United
States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.17
This provision does not mention a presidential power to use force to protect and rescue
Americans threatened abroad, but it is generally assumed that there is some such power, and
presidents have exercised such a power on a number of occasions since the enactment of the
Resolution, often without controversy.18
Presidential administrations have varied in whether they have accepted the
constitutionality of the 60-day cutoff provision. But even with this uncertainty about
14
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whether the provision is constitutional, it appears to have had some effect on presidential
action. Instead of openly disregarding the 60-day provision, when presidents have acted
without congressional authorization they have typically either (1) concluded the military
campaigns quickly (such as in Grenada and Panama in the 1980s), (2) claimed (sometimes
questionably) that they had statutory authority that satisfied the requirements of the
Resolution (such as with the 1999 bombing campaign in Kosovo and the conflict against the
Islamic State that began in 2014), or (3) interpreted the Resolution as inapplicable (such the
Obama administration’s claim in 2011 that continued U.S. participation in a bombing
campaign against Libya did not amount to “hostilities” for purposes of the Resolution).
Even though the Resolution has not been entirely disregarded by presidents, most
observers do not view it as a success.19 Because courts have generally avoided enforcing it,
its effectiveness depends on the extent to which the executive branch either voluntarily
complies with it or is induced to do so by Congress. But Congress has shown little political
will to enforce it, and the executive branch has interpreted it in a manner designed to
preserve executive branch flexibility. For example, although probably not its intent, the
Resolution’s 60-day cutoff provision has been interpreted by the executive branch as a
congressional acceptance of presidential authority to use force for less than 60 days.20
Moreover, although the Resolution expressly states that appropriations statutes are not to be
construed as authorizations to use force, the executive branch has maintained that the
Resolution—since it is merely a statute—cannot control how later statutes (including
appropriations statutes) are construed.21 Furthermore, the Resolution leaves undefined the
key term “hostilities,” and the executive branch has interpreted that term in a manner that
allows it to bypass the Resolution for some uses of force.22
Congressional and Judicial Checks on Presidential War-Making
Apart from its enactment of the War Powers Resolution, Congress generally has not
done much to resist presidential unilateralism in the war powers area. Sometimes there has
been widespread support in Congress for the presidential action and therefore its members
have seen no reason to insist on the formality of specific statutory authorization. This
appears to have been true, for example, with the initiation of the Korean War and may also
19
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be true to some extent with the campaign against the Islamic State. On other occasions,
Congress has been content to wait and see how a campaign unfolds without taking a vote on
it, thereby avoiding accountability if the campaign does not turn out well.
Even when Congress has concerns about a military campaign, it is often reluctant to
take actions that might appear unsupportive of U.S. troops or that might hurt the chances of
U.S. success. More generally, Congress as a collective body often has difficulty mobilizing
opposition to the President, especially if one or both houses of Congress are controlled by
the President’s political party. At other times, partisan conflict may simply create gridlock,
making it impossible to reach agreement on legislation. In early 2015, for example,
President Obama proposed to Congress that it enact an authorization statute for the conflict
against the Islamic State, but as of 2017 (with a new presidential administration) Congress
still had not acted, even though it does not appear that Congress is opposed to the use of
force in that conflict.23
The United States has a powerful court system, so in theory the judiciary could
police executive violations of either the constitutional law of war powers or the War Powers
Resolution. In practice, however, courts in the modern era have invoked various
“justiciability” limitations to avoid addressing these issues. They have insisted that the
plaintiffs meet the requirements for standing and have generally disallowed members of
Congress from claiming standing.24 They have also refused to consider cases that are not
sufficiently “ripe,” either because it is not clear whether or to what extent force will be used
or because Congress has not yet attempted to use its own resources to resist a president’s
unilateral action.25 And, most significantly, they have tended to treat issues concerning the
distribution of war authority as presenting a nonjusticiable “political question.”26 To be
sure, the Supreme Court has signaled in recent years that the political question doctrine
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should have a narrow scope.27 But very few cases ever get reviewed by the Supreme Court,
and the lower federal courts continue to apply the political question doctrine with some
vigor in the foreign affairs area.28
In light of modern practice and the lack of significant judicial review, some
academic observers have suggested that presidents now have the authority to initiate at least
small-scale military campaigns that they deem to be in the national interest, especially if
there is no significant use of ground troops.29 Under this view, one would in effect need to
distinguish between certain “big wars” that require congressional authorization and “small
wars” that would not. This is essentially the position suggested by the executive branch
(albeit noncommittally) in connection with the Libya campaign in 2011. But other scholars
either read the historical practice differently or argue that it should not legitimize this degree
of presidential unilateralism.30
Other scholars accept that the above account might describe the “de facto” war
powers regime today, but they contest its legality and desirability.31 These scholars maintain
that Congress should be doing more to maintain an authorizing role, and that, outside of
narrow self-defense and rescue situations, it is dangerous to allow the executive branch
unilateral authority to use force abroad. Various proposals have been made over the years to
improve the situation, such as through increased judicial review or amendments to the War
Powers Resolution, but so far little has been done.
Example: Syria in 2013
The uncertain state of the constitutional law of U.S. war powers is illustrated by the
deliberations in the Obama administration in 2013 about whether to use military force
against Syria. The prior year, President Obama had announced that the use of chemical
weapons by the Assad regime in Syria in its civil war would involve crossing a “red line”
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that would carry “enormous consequences.”32 When it appeared that the regime had crossed
that line by using sarin gas against a rebel-held suburb of Damascus, Obama began
preparing a military response. At that point, it appeared that he would act without seeking
authorization from Congress. Abruptly, however, he changed course and said that he would
first seek congressional approval.33 This was a politically risky move, because it was far
from clear that Congress would provide such authorization. The issue soon became moot,
however, when Russia facilitated a diplomatic solution.34
Obama’s change of heart occurred shortly after Britain’s prime minister indicated
that he would accept a vote by the House of Commons rejecting that country’s participation
in using force against Syria. In Obama’s public statement explaining his decision to seek
authorization from Congress, he specifically referred to “what we saw happen in the United
Kingdom this week when the Parliament of our closest ally failed to pass a resolution with
a similar goal, even as the Prime Minister supported taking action.”35 Obama also noted
that, while he thought that he had the authority to carry out this military action without
congressional authorization, he was also “mindful that I’m the President of the world’s
oldest constitutional democracy.”36
The decision to seek congressional authorization for the use of force against Syria
was consistent with the views of presidential war powers that Obama had expressed while
he was a candidate for the presidency in 2007. In an interview with Charlie Savage—then a
reporter for the Boston Globe and later a reporter for the New York Times—Obama stated
that “[t]he President does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a
military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to
the nation.”37 In privately discussing with his aides his decision to seek congressional
authorization for using force against Syria, Obama apparently referred back to that 2007
interview.38
The Obama administration’s practice, however, was not always consistent with
Obama’s earlier views. Most notably, the administration used military force against the
Qaddafi regime in Libya in 2011 without first obtaining congressional authorization, even
though the United States did not face any actual or imminent threat. In defending the
constitutionality of this action, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
32
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expressed a view of presidential war powers that is substantially broader than the one that
Obama had expressed while a candidate for the presidency. Quoting from prior executive
branch legal opinions, OLC observed that “the President has the power to commit United
States troops abroad, as well as to take military action, for the purpose of protecting
important national interests, even without specific prior authorization from Congress.”39
OLC did acknowledge that the President might be required to obtain congressional
authorization for a use of force amounting to a “war,” but it insisted that such a requirement
would be triggered “only by prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically
involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period,” a
standard that it argued was not met with respect to the use of force against Libya.40 Even
for the subsequent aborted action in Syria, executive branch lawyers had apparently advised
the President that he had the authority take unilateral action,41 and Obama himself claimed
that although he was seeking congressional authorization, “I believe I have the authority to
carry out this military action without specific congressional authorization.”42
Potential Benefits of Comparativism
In considering whether to seek congressional authorization for the use of force
against Syria in 2013, President Obama seemed to take into account the action by Britain’s
prime minister in seeking and respecting parliamentary input. This example is a reminder
that other constitutional democracies face similar issues in deciding how to regulate the use
of military force.
There is substantial variation in how countries have approached the relationship
between the legislative and executive branches with respect to war powers, so there is rich
material for comparative evaluation.43 For example, a 2010 study found that there was “a
remarkable variance regarding the war powers of national parliaments in Europe, ranging
39
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from ‘very strong’ in Austria, Germany and Finland to ‘very weak’ in the cases of France,
the UK and Greece.”44 Similarly, Professor Tom Ginsburg has found, based on data from
the Comparative Constitutions Project (which is coding all of the world’s constitutions since
1789), that “there are a wide variety of approaches to the problem of declaring war.”45
Moreover, the distribution of war authority in other countries has not been static, and the
trends and changes over time may themselves be instructive. For example, even though the
initiation of war is considered a “royal prerogative” of the Crown in Great Britain, in recent
years the executive branch in that country has sought legislative approval before using
military force.46 That said, it is not clear that the overall trend among constitutional
democracies is in favor of legislative control over the use of force.47
Importantly, comparing the role of legislatures in decisions to use force is much
more complicated than simply looking to see whether their ex ante legislative approval is
required. As one comparative study that focused on ex ante approval acknowledged:
Ex ante veto power is certainly not the only way in which parliaments could
exert control over deployments. Even ex ante consultation, for example,
could give parliament the opportunity to affect executive decisions
somewhat. Parliaments, moreover, may become involved in other phases of
a mission, not only before troops are deployed. Parliaments may, for
example, be empowered to call the troops back home in the early phase of an
operation. They may become involved at later stages of a deployment by
retaining the right to monitor activities, thus acting as a watchdog whose
presence may continue to affect executive decisions. Finally, parliament may
become influential after a deployment has ended by performing an evaluation
and exposing weaknesses in how government and the military leadership
handled an operation.48
There is thus a wide range of variables relating to domestic control over war powers that
could be compared.
Despite such rich material, any comparative analysis of how nations regulate war
powers should be approached with caution. Each country’s laws and practices are
embedded within that country’s particular legal culture, political system, and historical
tradition. Moreover, there may be limitations on how much one can translate the approach
of a parliamentary system to the U.S. presidential system. There may also be particular
44
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pathologies that apply to the U.S. Congress (such as the extent of its partisanship,
unpopularity, or vulnerability to lobbying interests) that do not apply to other legislatures.
In addition, nations vary widely in the extent to which they can and do project military
power abroad—both unilaterally and as part of collective operations—and it is difficult to
find many nations that are comparable to the United States in this regard.49 More generally,
there is a danger (as with, for example, reliance on legislative history or historical materials)
that comparative materials will be invoked selectively with a focus only on those most
helpful to a particular position.
With appropriate caution, however, there are various ways in which a study of
comparative war powers might be useful, including to those who seek to regulate war
powers in the United States.50 For example, knowledge of other nations’ approaches can be
useful for statutory drafting—for example, in considering how the War Powers Resolution
might be improved. Consider, for example, Germany’s 2005 Parliamentary Participation
Act. In requiring the consent of the Bundestag (the lower house of Germany’s legislature)
for military deployments, the Act does a number of things that are distinct from the U.S.
War Powers Resolution. Instead of having the consent requirement hinge on the undefined
term “hostilities,” it uses “deployment” as the trigger and defines it to mean “when soldiers
of the German Federal Armed Forces are involved in armed engagements, or their
involvement in an armed engagement is to be anticipated.” It also specifies in detail the
information that the executive must provide to the Bundestag in its request for authorization.
In addition, to make the scheme more workable, it sets forth a more simplified procedure for
the approval of “deployments of minor scope and intensity,” which it proceeds to define and
illustrate. The Act further provides that advance legislative approval is not needed for
“[d]eployments in the event of imminent danger which allow no scope for delay” and for
“operations whose purpose is to rescue persons from particularly dangerous situations,
provided that the holding of a public debate in the Bundestag would endanger the lives of
the persons in need of rescue,” but it requires that the Bundestag “be informed appropriately
prior to and during deployment” in these situations and that the executive seek the
Bundestag’s ex post approval promptly.
Comparativism can also highlight alternatives to statutory regulation. For example,
another form of regulation can occur through the development of “constitutional
conventions” of expected political behavior. Constitutional conventions are “maxims,
beliefs, and principles that guide officials in how they exercise political discretion.”51 The
49
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recent practice of Great Britain might be instructive. Even though it has a tradition of
executive control over war as part of the prerogative powers of the Crown, in recent years
the government appears to have accepted that a constitutional convention has emerged
whereby, except in emergency situations, the House of Commons is to be given an advance
opportunity to debate the issue.52 Proposals to convert this convention into a more binding
statute, along the lines of the U.S. and German approaches, have to date been rejected.53
Studying comparative practice might also allow for a reassessment of the proper role
and capacity of U.S. courts in examining war powers questions. Again, Germany is an
interesting model, given that its courts have been especially willing to address war powers
issues, including in challenges brought by the legislative branch.54 By contrast, courts in
some countries like Japan and Great Britain seem to be closer to the U.S. practice of
avoiding war powers adjudication, and their rationales also would be worth study.55 In
addition to general questions of judicial capacity, comparativism might be instructive in
thinking about whether and to what extent courts might draw upon international law in
assessing executive war powers authority.56
The most controversial use of comparativism, at least in the United States, would be
in constitutional interpretation. Given how difficult it is to amend the U.S. Constitution
(which would typically require supermajority votes in both houses of Congress and approval
by three-fourths of the states), it is unlikely that comparative study would lead to a formal
change in the constitutional text. As illustrated above, however, there is substantial room for
interpretive disagreements over the meaning of the existing Constitution as it relates to warmaking. Yet there has been robust debate in the United States over the propriety of looking
to foreign and international materials to interpret the U.S. Constitution—for example, in
determining the meaning of the Constitution’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments.”
One’s position in this debate depends to some extent on one’s general approach to
52
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constitutional interpretation.57 Those who adhere to a strictly “originalist” approach to
constitutional interpretation may dismiss modern comparative practice as irrelevant because
it does not shed light on what the Constitution was understood to mean when it was
adopted.58 By contrast, interpreters who are willing to consider additional sources of
constitutional meaning—such as the purposes of constitutional provisions, inferences from
the constitutional structure, and the practical effects of adopting a particular interpretation—
are more likely to view comparative materials as potentially relevant.59
Despite such debate, a majority of the Supreme Court has been willing at various
times to consider comparative materials.60 Moreover, some of the objections to considering
those materials may have less force in the war powers context, which is inherently
international, than in the context of issues that seem more domestic in nature (such as the
death penalty). For example, if Congress’s authority to control the use of military force
turns on whether the use of force amounts to a “war,” as some scholars (and, at least
sometimes, the executive branch) contend, then it may be instructive to see how other
countries have drawn such a distinction (or similar distinctions). This is especially so given
that the Constitution does not define the term “war” and its meaning may have evolved over
time as the result of international law and practice.
In any event, even if one rejects a “borrowing” of comparative practice as part of
constitutional interpretation, there is a subtler way in which comparative materials might be
relevant to constitutional analysis: they can provide a backdrop against which it is possible
to gain a better understanding of one’s own constitution. Knowing about alternative
constitutional approaches can, for example, highlight the ways in which U.S. law reflects
particular choices that could have been made differently. This is true even when (or perhaps
especially when) the interpreter concludes that the constitutional analysis adopted by other
countries is not well suited to the U.S. context.61 For example, whereas the U.S.
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Constitution assigns the power to declare war to Congress, many modern Constitutions
assign that power to the executive, while also often subjecting the executive’s military
action to legislative approval.62 Certainly this should at least be of interest to scholars of the
U.S. Constitution. And, as a practical matter, judges and other officials are likely to take it
into account once they are aware of it, even if they do not expressly rely on it in their
decisionmaking.63
Conclusion
The U.S. Constitution is more than 225 years old and is relatively short compared to
many modern constitutions. Since the Constitution was adopted, there have been significant
changes in the size of the U.S. military, the U.S. role in the world, the general scope of
presidential authority, and the international law governing the use of force. Moreover, at
least in the post-World War II era, U.S. courts have generally stayed out of disputes over the
Constitution’s distribution of war authority. This judicial reticence has meant that
substantial war powers practice has developed without any clear indication from the courts
whether it is lawful. Furthermore, Congress’s one effort to enact a general regulatory statute
concerning the distribution of war authority—the War Powers Resolution—implicates its
own set of interpretive and constitutional uncertainties. As the United States continues to
think about how best to regulate the use of military force, and about the proper role of the
judiciary in policing such regulation, it can potentially learn from the experiences of other
countries that have grappled with similar questions. At a minimum, such comparative
reflection can allow for a deeper understanding of the United States’ particular approach to
war powers.
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